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The Changing Public/Private Mix in the  
American Healthcare System 
ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the fundamental changes in the American health care system dur-
ing the past four decades. By applying a multidimensional framework, the changing role 
of the state in financing, service provision, and in the regulation of the health care sys-
tem are scrutinized. The results suggest a considerable “blurring” of the private, market 
based health care system of the United States. While the state constantly retreats from 
service provision, it substantially intensifies its engagement in financing and also in the 
regulation of the system. The most path-breaking changes in regulation, however, are 
observed through the introduction of managed care, which, from a private market side, 
brought new elements of hierarchical coordination into the system. 
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The Changing Public/Private Mix in the  
American Healthcare System 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research context and analytical approach 
This paper addresses the changing role of the state1 in the American health care system 
during the past four decades. It starts from the point in time, when the state became an 
important actor through the introduction of the public health insurance programs Medi-
care and Medicaid2 in 1965. The economic crisis following the oil price shocks in the 
1970s, however, forced the government to put cost containment strategies at the top of 
its agenda. The pertinent question here is therefore, how the role of the state has 
changed under the condition of “permanent austerity” (Pierson 2001). As the state is not 
the only actor in the American health care system, a complex interplay between public 
and private interventions (Hacker 2002: 23, Oberlander 2002) will come under scrutiny. 
In order to approach this research question in a systematic way, a multidimensional 
analytical framework is suggested distinguishing between the role of the state in financ-
ing, service provision, and the regulation dimension of health care systems (Roth-
gang/Cacace/Grimmeisen et al. 2005). Using the analogy of a house (figure 1) that 
represents the health care system in total, financing and service provision are the pillars. 
The regulation dimension represents the roof and therefore relates to the pillars by de-
scribing which aspect of the health care system, financing or service provision, is regu-
lated. The fundament symbolizes the values, goals, and perceptions in health care.3  
Figure 1: Financing, service provision and regulation of health care systems 
 
Source: Rothgang/Cacace/Grimmeisen et al. (2005)  
                                                 
1  In the US-context the notion of “the state” might be somewhat misleading. In this contribution, “the state” is the 
summary category for the federal, the states’, and the local governments. I will refer to “the states” in the follow-
ing, whenever addressing the single member states. 
2  Medicare and Medicaid provide health care coverage for the aged, the disabled, and for the indigent. 
3  This part of the house will not be explored here. See Albrecht/Frisina (2006) for a comparative examination of 
values in the health care systems of Britain, Germany, and the US.  
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Historically, market competition has been the dominant coordination mechanism in the 
health care system of the United State emphasizing the relevance of private actors in all  
aforementioned dimensions: in financing, in service provision, and in the regulation of 
health care. During the observation period, the growing role of the state primarily be-
comes manifest in funding of health care and in the regulation of these government-
funded programs. This is most surprising as conventional wisdom about the de-
regulatory American state in general, and the “private nature” (Docteur/Suppanz/Woo 
2003: 5) of the health care system in particular, teaches us the contrary. But in 2003, the 
level of public health expenditure measured as a percentage of the GDP was exactly as 
high in the US (6.8%) as, for example, in the United Kingdom; a country in which the 
role of the government in health care financing is very strong (OECD Health Data 
2006). Not even included in these figures are considerable amounts of tax exemptions 
(about 1% of GDP) through which the federal government subsidises private employ-
ment-based health insurance. Thus in terms of total health care expenditures, today 
more than half of spending comes from public sources.  
A second major trajectory of change to be explored here was initiated by the emer-
gence of a phenomenon which is often viewed as particularly American (Glied 2000: 
709), namely through managed care4. Managed care deeply affects the relationship 
among the three main actors in health care systems: insurers, providers and beneficiaries 
(Hacker/Marmor 1999). A highly diverse array of managed care arrangements has al-
most completely supplanted conventional indemnity insurance5 today. In short, man-
aged care arrangements brought about their own, particular instruments of steering pro-
viders’ and patients’ behaviour. From a regulatory perspective, a hierarchical form of 
governance has been established. Interestingly, although the US-government supported 
the spread of HMOs in the 1970s and contracts with private managed care organizations 
                                                 
4  Managed care is often contrasted with conventional indemnity insurance highlighting that there is “some kind of 
interference” in the transactions between insurers, doctors, and patients in the former. It is, however, not easy to 
define managed care in general, as it encompasses a highly diverse array of institutional arrangements. Thus al-
though a catch-all-definition of managed care would be very helpful at this point of reading, it is impossible to 
provide one. Hacker and Marmor (1999) take this point and propose to make no general statement about managed 
care at all but to differentiate carefully between different forms that emerged, i.e. between Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs), Point of Service (POS), or Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) for example. I fol-
low this proposition in my examination of managed care in section 2. 
5  Indemnity insurance was the dominant private health insurance arrangement until in the late 1980s (Kaiser/HRET 
2006). In the US, indemnity insurers reimburse for covered health care services only according to a percentage of 
what they consider the “usual and customary” charge. The provider is allowed to balance bill, i.e. to charge the 
patient for the difference. In addition, indemnity insurers require cost sharing from the insured persons.  
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today, it is not the state but private market participants that created this hierarchical 
mode of coordination (Cacace 2008, cf. Hsiao 2002).  
In order to explore these changes in detail, this contribution continues with a health 
care system overview (1.2). A short legislative history in section 1.3 provides with in-
formation on the most important reforms between 1965 and today. Due to its crucial 
importance, the next section (section 2) is dedicated to managed care, its growth and the 
instruments applied. What follows is a detailed assessment of the changing role of the 
state. By applying the analytical framework put forward above, changes are examined in 
the financing dimension (section 3), in service provision (section 4), and in the regula-
tion dimension (section 5). Finally, section 6 concludes by bringing together the evi-
dence about the changing public/private mix in the American health care system.  
1.2 Health care system overview 
Today, about 68% of the US population has private insurance; either employment based 
(60%) or as directly purchased individual plans (9%). The most vulnerable low-income 
groups (13%) as well as the aged over 65 and the disabled (14%) are covered by the 
main public insurance programs Medicare and Medicaid (US Census Bureau 2006). 
Although it had repeatedly been on the political agenda, no mandatory universal health 
insurance scheme has yet been legislated in the US. Thus in 2005, 16% of the US popu-
lation was without health insurance.6 Furthermore, due to inadequate benefit packages, 
millions must be considered as underinsured (Schön/Davis/How 2006, Stone 2000).7  
In private insurance, premiums are calculated based on the expected health risk. De-
pending on the specific health plan, cost sharing8 is required from the insured person. 
The major part of the privately insured receives coverage through group health plans 
provided by the employer on a voluntary basis (employer-sponsored health insurance). 
The state influences employer’s decision to offer coverage by making their contribution 
tax deductible. These tax subsidies are quite substantial as they account for 113 billion 
US$ (US OMB 2006), i.e. about 1% of the GDP or 7% of total health care expenditure. 
                                                 
6  Due to double coverage, these figures do not add up to 100%.  
7  According to the US Census Bureau (2006: 20) people were considered “uninsured” if they were not covered by 
any type of health insurance at any time in the previous calendar year. Under the category of “coverage” head 
counts are reported (see section 5.1). The term “underinsured”, however, relates to the content of the benefit 
package, i.e. the number and kinds of services included in an insurance contract (see section 5.6) and means that 
some insured persons, although they are covered by insurance, receive only a minimum of health care benefits.  
8  Cost sharing may have the form of deductibles, coinsurance rates, and co-payments, or any combination of these 
elements. A deductible means that a certain amount (like first US$ 500 per year) is to be paid out of the patient’s 
pocket before the insurance makes any pay-outs. Coinsurance is usually paid as a percentage rate (e.g. 10%) of 
the health care bill. Co-payments are defined as fixed amounts required per doctor visit, for example.  
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Employers either self-insure9 their employees or they contract with private health in-
surers in order to provide coverage. As they pay the major part of the insurance pre-
mium, i.e. between 73% of the cost for family insurance and 84% for individual cover-
age on an average (Kaiser/HRET 2006: 61), they pre-select the health insurance plans 
offered to their employees. Employers’ choice therefore plays a major role in the com-
petition between plans (Cacace/Rothgang/Thompson 2007, Keen/Light/Mays 2001). In 
employer-sponsored insurance, the number and the risk structure of employees within 
the firm is relevant for premium calculation. Small employers with a few severely ill 
employees may face prohibitively high premium costs (Reinhardt 1993, Kaiser/HRET 
2006). Thus, while most large employers offer health insurance, a great deal fewer small 
businesses actually provide coverage.10 By the same rationale, private health insurance 
can be unaffordable for single individuals who are not covered by group insurance. All 
these factors contribute to the fact that insurance coverage is closely linked to the spe-
cific working place.  
The public Medicare program is established as a social insurance scheme that pro-
vides health benefits to all individuals aged over 65. The program is divided into Part A 
for hospital insurance and Part B covering outpatient doctor visits. In both cases rela-
tively high co-payments are required from the beneficiaries and some services like e.g. 
long-term care, are not covered by Medicare at all (Green Book 2004). As a conse-
quence, many beneficiaries in addition hold a private insurance policy called Medigap11 
in order to insure them against cost sharing and for uncovered services.  
Medicaid, by contrast, is a means-tested program financed through federal and state 
tax revenues. Medicaid offers quite comprehensive coverage for the health care needs of 
the most vulnerable parts of the poor population (Reinhardt 2005). At present, all gov-
ernment funded health care programs12 taken together account for nearly half of total 
health care spending.  
                                                 
9  Self-insurance is a health care financing technique by which employers pay claims out of an internally funded 
pool bearing the full financial risk for the health care cost of their employees. Occasionally, the administration of 
plans is left to private insurance carriers.  
10  In 2006, only 60% of firms with 3-199 workers offered coverage compared to almost 100% of large firms (200 or 
more workers). This number declined from 68% in 2000 (Kaiser/ HRET 2006: 34).  
11  Medigap is a supplementary health insurance policy sold by private insurance companies to cover the services not 
included in the Medicare program. Medigap policies are regulated by federal and state law and are standardized 
in order to secure comparability.  
12  In addition to Medicare and Medicaid, the government finances some minor programs like e.g. the public health 
programs and some programs provided for special population groups, like the active members of the military ser-
vices and their families and the veterans (e.g. TRICARE, Veteran Affairs). 
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The delivery of services, with the medical profession and hospitals as the chief ac-
tors, is largely the domain of the private sector. Hospitals, represented by the American 
Hospital Association (AHA), are mainly private non-profit providers. Although some 
physicians13 are directly employed in hospitals or in Health Maintenance Organizations 
(HMOs), most are self-employed private professionals either working independently or 
as part of a medical group (Walshe 2003: 52, Jacobson 2001). The medical groups in-
corporate a number of physicians, either in a single specialty area but often across a 
number of specialties (multispecialty groups). The majority of specialists conduct their 
practices within a hospital setting.  
Since the concern for the quality of health care provision has increased in recent 
years, service providers are increasingly monitored and evaluated. Managed care or-
ganizations, too, are held responsible when the quality of care is not met. For this pur-
pose almost all US-member states have passed patients’ right laws providing the legal 
basis for litigation against health insurance plans in the cases when needed services are 
denied (Docteur/Suppanz/Woo 2003, Flood/Stabile/Tuohy 2001). This also gave rise to 
some regulatory power being given to the courts. 
Due to the simultaneous decentralization and fragmentation of the American health 
care system, administrative costs14 are high and considerable sources of inefficiencies 
exist (Woolhandler/Himmelstein 2002, Reinhardt 1993). Thus while the advocates of 
the system speak in favor of the freedom of choice and consumers’ sovereignty, critical 
observers condemn its “undesirability, unaffordability, and ungovernability” (Mar-
mor/Mashaw/Harvey 1992: 175). Indeed, health care in the US is the most expensive 
within the OECD world consuming more than 15% of the GDP, while the nation as a 
whole ranks relatively low on customary health-status indicators (Schoen/Osborn/ 
Huynh et al. 2005, Reinhardt 2005). On the other hand, the American health care sys-
tem has brought about some innovations, the most path-breaking examples being man-
aged care and Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs15), which were the forerunners for simi-
lar arrangements all over the OECD world. 
                                                 
13  The term “physician” in this case study is used as a summary category for the whole profession, i.e. for primary 
and specialist care doctors, surgeons etc.   
14  It is estimated that about 25% of total health care spending today is absorbed by administration (Woolhan-
dler/Himmelstein 2002). 
15  DRGs were introduced in 1983 by the Medicare program as a reimbursement method for hospital stays. In con-
trast to the cost reimbursement method that was supplanted, the DRGs are calculated in advance, i.e. prospec-
tively. For DRG calculation, all illnesses are split into currently about 540 groups and costs per case are estimated 
within each group. Adjustments are made for certain factors such as local wage levels, teaching hospitals, dura-
tion of stay, and hospitals with a large proportion of indigent patients. DRG payments cover the hospital stay in-
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1.3 The major reforms  
In 1965 the Johnson administration enacted Medicare and Medicaid as publicly funded 
programs under the Titles XVIII and XIX of the Social Security Act. Medicare falls 
within the authority of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and is 
now administered by the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services16 (CMS). In the 
Medicaid program, the federal government sets the broad guidelines under which the 
states administer the single programs.  
After the state increased the access to health care through Medicare and Medicaid, 
the oil price shock and “tax payer’s revolt” forced the government to put cost contain-
ment strategies at the top on the agenda (Marmor 2000, Patel/Rushefsky 1999). Once 
that this need was of paramount importance, the debate about how to cope with soaring 
health costs centered on two broad approaches; namely whether the state or the market 
is more promising in achieving this objective (Marmor/Mashaw/Harvey 1992). There-
fore, as a regulatory measure, the federal government and the states began to control the 
number and the rates of hospitals beginning in the early 1970s. In addition, peer review 
organizations were established to evaluate and monitor care provided in the publicly 
funded programs. At about the same time, the federal government promoted the cost 
saving effects of HMOs. In 1973 it established the HMO Act targeted at the spread of 
managed care in private and in public settings. Although both approaches to contain 
health care cost – the regulatory and the market based – were applied, their success was 
limited. Continuingly rising medical costs combined with a recession during 1973–1975 
contributed to the withdrawal of proposals to establish a national health insurance pro-
gram in the mid-1970s (Patel/Rushefsky 1999).  
Although Medicare and Medicaid were under severe fiscal pressure almost from the 
moment the programs began, major inclusion processes into the public schemes halted. 
In 1981 President Reagan’s proposal to abolish the entitlement character of the Medi-
caid program failed to pass the Congress, but the program nevertheless experienced 
some major changes. In line with Reagan’s “new federalism” the states got more discre-
tion in defining eligibility rules and also obtained waivers17 to force Medicaid benefici-
aries into private managed care plans. In the Medicare program, a prospective payment 
system (PPS) based on Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) was introduced in 1983. 
Thus, in contrast to his rhetoric of deregulation, the Reagan administration in fact more 
                                                                                                                                               
cluding all ancillary services without surgery and other physician fees. Investment costs are included to a certain 
degree (Getzen 2004).  
16  The CMS until 2001 was known as the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). 
17  Waivers allow the member states to deviate from federal regulation in the Medicaid program. 
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heavily regulated the public health care programs, especially as the medical profession 
is concerned. 
In private insurance, the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 assigns general regulatory 
and tax collecting competency to the single member states (Jost 2001, Pol-
litz/Tapay/Hadley et al. 2000). Thus a decentralized approach is taken with the conse-
quence of considerable variation between the member states. What is more, in 1974, 
through the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the federal govern-
ment exempted all self-insured health plans from the states’ taxation, regulation, and 
control (Hacker 2004, Gabel/Jensen/Hawkins 2003).18 Unregulated private insurance, 
however, produces adverse effects. Thus the de-regulations of ERISA worsened the 
situation of the uninsured (Cacace/Rothgang/Thompson 2007). To partially overcome 
these limitations, the federal government mandated the COBRA-plans19 in 1985 as a 
minimal protection of workers in the transition between jobs. 
In order to solve the problem of the high number of uninsured, President Clinton 
proposed to establish mandatory insurance on the basis of “managed competition” (cf. 
Enthoven/Kronick 1989a,b) in 1993. According to the proposal, coverage should be 
provided through employers in a government-regulated, but highly competitive insur-
ance market. The reform proposal, however, failed against the strong resistance of sev-
eral actors (Quadagno 2005, Giaimo/Manow 1999). After the defeat of the Clinton plan 
several incremental steps were taken to increase access to existing public and private 
programs (Hackey 2001, Walshe 2003, Pollitz/Tapay/Hadley et al. 2000). In 1996 the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), for example, was estab-
lished to secure portability and the continuation of private group insurance. HIPAA is a 
federal law, thus all states and all health plans, even those exempted under ERISA, have 
to comply with HIPAA. Another step in this direction was the Balanced Budget Act 
(BBA) of 1997. With the BBA President Clinton signed the most noteworthy extension 
                                                 
18  For example, most US-states mandate private insurers to finance an internal risk-pool in order to cover those parts 
of the population who are otherwise hard to insure (Acs/Long/Marquis et al. 1996). Under ERISA, self-insured 
health plans do not contribute to the financing of these pools. The effects of ERISA have been quite substantial as 
self-insurance grew considerably. While in 1984 only about 8% of all insured workers were covered by self-
insurance, currently 55% are in some sort of self-insured health plan (Erdmann 1995: 102, Kaiser/ HRET 2006: 
127). 
19  In the case of job loss or in the transition between jobs, COBRA-plans enable the individual to continue group 
health plans on a premium, which is calculated on the basis of risk pooling. However, the duration of COBRA 
plans is restricted from 18 to a maximum of 36 months, and the insured has to pay the full costs (102%) out of 
his/her own pocket. COBRA-plans received their name as they are created under the Consolidated Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985.  
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of Medicaid, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), into law. In addi-
tion, the Medicare+Choice (Part C) program was created, which gave Medicare benefi-
ciaries a wider choice of managed care health plans. HIPAA and the BBA legislation 
also laid the fundamentals for Medical Saving Accounts (MSA)20 in private insurance 
and in the Medicare program thereby underlining the increasing reliance on private 
market arrangements in the public programs (Fuchs/James 2005).  
The growing importance of the private sector arrangements also becomes most evi-
dent when considering the most recent Medicare legislation, the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003. The MMA was enacted to 
offer a voluntary drug benefit21 to subscribers to be phased in by 2006. The benefit can 
be offered as a stand-alone benefit (Part D) or as a part of managed care plans, which 
from 2003 on was called Medicare Advantage thereby replacing Medicare+Choice. In 
both cases, private insurers offer the drug benefit and are allowed to negotiate with 
pharmaceutical companies for drug prices; thus the boundaries between the public and 
the private become increasingly blurred (Gold 2005).  
2.  THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE HIERARCHY IN THE MANAGED CARE 
MARKET 
The fundaments for managed care were laid as early as in the 1930s, but it took a con-
siderable time span for managed care to break through. With managed care a new and 
exceptional mode of governing the health care system emerged, as hierarchical control 
over market participants is exerted by private actors, namely by private health insurers 
(Cacace 2008, cf. Hsiao 2002). Due to the impact of these events for the following ar-
gumentation, this section is inserted here to provide an overview of the instruments ap-
plied in managed care (section 2.1) and the most relevant stages of its evolution (section 
2.2). From the highly diverse array of managed care arrangements, it focuses on the 
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), the Preferred Provider Organizations 
                                                 
20  MSA are part of a broader range of insurance products called consumer-driven health plans, which rely on high 
deductibles in order to make consumers price-conscious about their choices. MSA must be combined with very 
high-deductible health plans providing only a minimum benefit to the insured. The money saved in the accounts 
may be spent on the benefits at the time services are needed.  
21  The MMA is criticised because the statutes prevent the CMS from bargaining with drug companies for lower 
drug prices leaving this task explicitly to the private health plans that offer the benefit, instead. Another critical 
issue is that the program heavily relies on consumer out-of-pocket payments. The standard drug benefit in 2007, 
for example, requires a deductible of US$ 265. Once this deductible is reached, the enrolee pays a coinsurance 
rate of 25%. If total spending for drugs reaches 2,400 US$, the enrolee has to bear all cost until total spending 
reaches about 5,450 US$ (doughnut hole) (Kaiser Foundation 2007). From that amount on, the consumer receives 
catastrophic coverage, but still has to contribute a 5% coinsurance rate. 
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(PPOs), and Point of Service Plans (POS). These organizational forms are the most 
common arrangements in a highly diversified managed care market and most appropri-
ate for an illustration of the ongoing changes. 
2.1 The mechanisms of governance in managed care 
Although there is no single broadly accepted definition, there seems to be some agree-
ment that managed care differs with respect to the specifications of the contractual rela-
tionship between insurer, patients and service providers from conventional insurance 
(Glied 2000: 709, cf. Cacace 2008). More specifically, managed care organizations may 
interfere in the relationship between doctor and patient and limit the services provided, 
or they may contract with selected providers only (selective contracting), thereby limit-
ing the choice of provider. What complicates the analysis, is the fact that the instru-
ments applied to control providers’ and patients’ behaviour once differed largely be-
tween the organizational forms but become increasingly mixed today (cf. 
Hacker/Marmor 1999).  
In the first Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) that emerged in the American 
health care market, insurers and service providers became integrated into one organiza-
tion (see e.g. Wagner 2003, Patel/Rushefsky 1999). For this purpose, HMOs employed 
primary and specialist care providers on a salary and built up or acquired their own clin-
ics. Thereby HMOs not only merged the functions of insurance and service provision 
under unified ownership, but also tightly integrated inpatient and outpatient care provi-
sion (Newbrander/Eichler 2001). This vertically and horizontally integrated organiza-
tional form stands in deep contrast to traditional indemnity insurance where insurers, 
inpatient and outpatient care providers were used to operate independently from each 
other. While in indemnity insurance the provider is reimbursed according to the fee he 
or she demands (fee-for-service principle), the services in an HMO are provided at a 
fixed price agreed upon in advance (prospective payments). Over time, the HMO mar-
ket became highly diversified with the staff-model, the group-model, the network-
model, and the independent practice association (IPA)22 as the core managed care or-
ganizations. In addition, so called “mixed models” emerged which combine at least two  
                                                 
22  The staff-model characterizes an HMO where the physicians are employed on a salary. In the group-model, the 
HMO contracts with a provider group, which in turn employs the single physicians. The group-model HMOs 
(like the staff-models) are closed-panel HMOs, because the physicians must be members of the contracted group 
practice to participate in the HMO. In the network-model and in Independent Practice Associations (IPAs) the 
HMO contracts with more than one provider group and also with individual practices in the latter. IPAs are an 
open-panel arrangement, which means that they contract with all physicians who meet the selection criteria of the 
IPA and the HMO. Network-HMOs in contrast can be either closed or open-panel HMOs (cf. Wagner 2003). 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 58) 
- 10 - 
aforementioned HMO-models. Since about one decade, the portion of the IPAs and of 
mixed models grew markedly amongst HMOs. 
In the staff-model HMO, physicians are employed on a salary, which is optionally 
combined with a financial incentive (bonus/malus option) (Wagner 2003, Ame-
lung/Schumacher 2004). In all other cases, i.e. the group-model, the network-model, 
and the IPAs, the HMO selectively contracts with one or several multispecialty provider 
groups. Providers are selected according to their economic and quality-related perform-
ance (credentialing), and contract renewal depends on the providers’ actual performance 
characteristics (Kongstvedt 2003, Erdmann 1995). Selective contracting implies some 
scope for negotiation between insurers and providers. Thus, depending on the competi-
tive market environment, the HMO can use its market clout in order to bargain for 
lower prices (Amelung/Schumacher 2004). Payment is usually performed on a prospec-
tive all-inclusive capitation rate, which means that providers receive a fixed sum per 
HMO-subscriber (Wagner 2003). Although the capitation rates are risk-adjusted, usu-
ally by taking age and gender as indicators, the risk of treatment is shifted from the in-
surer towards the provider. Therefore the service provider is forced to match economic 
considerations with medical treatment decisions if he contracts with an HMO on a capi-
tation basis. But also mixed remuneration methods are applied, including discounts on a 
fee-for-service rate where a portion of payment is withheld and paid out depending 
upon the performance of provider. In addition, providers have to accept review proce-
dures and further inference in clinical decision-making. 
Not only the provider’s, but also the patients’ behavior is controlled in an HMO. 
There are several restrictions put on patients’ utilization of care. For example, the pa-
tient’s free choice of doctors, a principle that was traditionally upheld in indemnity in-
surance, is constrained to pre-selected providers. In most HMOs a gatekeeper, which in 
general is the primary care physician, restricts patients’ access to specialists and option-
ally also to inpatient hospital care. Depending on the seriousness of their ailment, pa-
tients in HMOs might not even see a physician at all during their episode of illness, as 
new professional careers like the nurse practitioner or the physician assistant were es-
tablished to provide appropriate care at lower cost (Scott/Ruef/Mendel et al. 2000). Cost 
sharing, as an alternative method of steering the excessive consumption of services 
(moral hazard), in general is not applied by HMOs. With this respect HMOs differs 
crucially from indemnity insurance and from the Preferred Provider Organizations, 
which are illustrated next. 
In a Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), a network of self-employed providers is 
related to the managed care organization through contracts. In this respect PPOs do not 
differ substantially from most HMOs. Instead of using a capitation, remuneration is 
usually performed on discounted fee-for-service rates (Kruse 1997). The discounts pro-
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vide some scope for bargaining and each party’s relative negotiation strength deter-
mines how the risk shared between the providers and the managed care organization 
(Amelung/Schumacher 2004, Joffe 2003). Although discounted fee-for-service pay-
ments typically do not concentrate as much risk on physicians as when capitation pay-
ments are applied, physicians’ behavior is monitored by utilization reviews23 and stan-
dardization requirements. Selective contracting is also a powerful instrument to influ-
ence physicians’ behaviour and as the PPO network constitutes an important source of 
revenue, physicians are concerned not to be de-listed from the provider panels 
(Rich/Erb 2005). Because there is usually no gatekeeper, patients in a PPO have direct 
access to specialists (Newbrander/Eichler 2001). Additionally, they may choose a pro-
vider from outside of the contracted network, yet at the cost of higher co-payments.  
The Point of Service Plans (POS) combine the features of HMOs and PPOs. In POS 
the consumer chooses a provider at the time the service is needed and makes co-
payments if he does not accept gatekeeping or the pre-selected network. Therefore the 
POS and PPO alike provide more choice but at the same time use cost sharing as an 
instrument to influence consumer’s behaviour.  
2.2 The proliferation of managed care  
Managed care health plans compete with traditional indemnity insurance on lower 
prices for services and lower cost sharing while at the same time providing more com-
prehensive benefit packages (Erdmann 1995). As a result of this highly competitive 
process indemnity plans, which had prevailed in employer-sponsored health insurance 
at 73% in 1988, were almost completely driven out of the market by 2006 (3%) (Kai-
ser/HRET 2006: 57). At the same time, many fundamental changes within the managed 
care landscape took place, like e.g. the increasing “profitization” of managed care or-
ganizations, the rapid growth of the Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), and the 
increasing demand for regulation as one consequence of the managed care backlash24.   
                                                 
23  According to the point in time they set in, utilization reviews are categorized as prospective, concurrent or retro-
spective instruments. Pre-certification or second opinion requirements, for example, mean that approval must be 
obtained from the insurance company, before elective surgery is performed (prospectively). As a form of retro-
spective review, managed care organizations will sometimes refuse to pay for services that do not meet their 
standards (Getzen 2004: 205). 
24  The backlash describes an increasing reservation of the public against managed care as a consequence of quality 
concerns, rising especially in conjunction with the HMOs from the mid-1990s on (Blendon/Brodie/Benson et al. 
1998). 
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In the 1970s, when managed care was still rare, relatively small non-profit25 Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) were the only arrangements that were offered. 
From the mid-1980s on, HMOs experienced enormous growth, increasing consolida-
tion, and the conversion into commercial for-profit enterprises (“profitization”). While 
in 1981 only 12% of all HMO enrolees subscribed to a for-profit plan, this number in-
creased to 63% by 1997 and remains at that level until today (CMS 2003a). HMOs pro-
liferated quickly; within less than 10 years they doubled their market share from 16% 
(1988) of all covered workers to 31% in 1996 (Kaiser/ HRET 2006). From 1996 on, the 
number of HMO enrolees declined and the more loosely structured PPOs, gained 
ground in the managed care market, a development referred to as the managed care 
backlash. In response to the backlash, most HMOs started Point of Service Plans (POS) 
in order to regain market share. POS peaked around 1998/99 with 24% of all covered 
workers but declined thereafter. By 2005 only 21% of all covered workers subscribed to 
a HMO, and 13% to a POS with declining tendency, while PPOs account for 61% (Kai-
ser/ HRET 2006). As the for-profit ownership is even more prominent in PPOs, more 
than 70% of managed care organizations are for-profit today (Town/Feldman/ 
Wholey 2004).  
Now turning to the role which the state played in these changes, the federal govern-
ment clearly supported the spread of HMOs in public and in private settings. Convinced 
by the efficiency gains to be attained, the federal government passed the HMO Act in 
1973. The HMO Act advised employers with more than 25 employees (who offer health 
insurance to their workers at all) to include at least one managed care plan in their set of 
choices. In addition, federal funds were provided to HMOs, which qualified26 to serve 
Medicare beneficiaries. The HMO Act had some effects on the growth of HMOs, but 
only further deregulation, including the federal requirement to relax states’ restrictions 
on selective contracting in the 1980s, supported the breakthrough of managed care 
(Glied 2000). In the 1980s the state assumed a more active role in promoting managed 
care amongst the beneficiaries of the public programs. Initiated through the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981, the US-member states received the option 
                                                 
25  Non-profit HMOs receive subsidies but are also subject to premium regulation. Most importantly, they are not 
allowed to adjust their premium rates to the individual health risk but have to apply community rating, which is 
the same mode of premium calculation like e.g. social insurance schemes. Non-profit HMOs therefore have com-
petitive disadvantages as compared to for-profit organizations. I will come back to this important difference in 
detail when discussing the regulation of the financing system in section 5.2. 
26  These qualification requirements were highly restrictive and therefore somewhat released in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. 
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to waive27 from federal Medicaid regulation in order to move beneficiaries into private 
managed care plans. Through the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) waivers were no longer 
required to make participation in managed care mandatory from 1997 on (Glied 2000). 
The percentage of Medicaid beneficiaries choosing (or having to choose) managed care 
grew from 9.5% in 1991 to 58% in 2002 (Hackey 2001, CMS 2003a). For Medicare 
beneficiaries, yet the incentives to join managed care plans were modest by comparison. 
As most Medicare beneficiaries hold Medigap policies, which insure them against the 
risk of cost sharing and incomplete benefit packages, participation in managed care is 
less attractive. Moreover, Medicare beneficiaries are used to having a free choice of 
provider and therapy (Reinhardt 2005), a principle that is not supported by managed 
care. Thus market penetration of Medicare+Choice was low; peaking at 16% in 1999, 
and declining thereafter to 14% in 2002 (CMS 2003a). However, with the most recent 
Medicare reform, the MMA of 2003, participation rate in managed care plans is ex-
pected to increase (Gold 2005).  
While the federal and the states’ government embraced an active role in moving 
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care plans, the states’ governments 
have also been active in passing laws that restrict managed care practices from the mid-
1990s on (Rich/Erb 2005: 244). In response to lobbying by consumers and health care 
providers, many states legislators enacted Patient’s Bill of Rights for consumer protec-
tion and so called “anti-managed care laws”28 (Quadagno 2005, Aspen Health Law Cen-
ter 1998). While the consumer protection laws enabled the litigation of managed care 
organization in the case of the denial of service regarded as necessary, the anti-managed 
care laws allowed some providers, especially pharmacies, the access to managed care 
markets (Flood/Stabile/Tuohy 2001, Jensen/Morrisey 1999). The states thereby limited 
the degree of control managed care organizations were able to exert on patients and pro-
viders.   
3. THE FINANCING DIMENSION  
In order to explore the changing role of the state in the American health care system, we 
now turn to the three analytical dimensions, i.e. to financing, service provision, and 
regulation. To start with the financing dimension, the role of the state is measured quan-
                                                 
27  The waiver applied in this case is the section 1915(b) (freedom-of-choice waiver), which allowed the states to 
experiment with new modes of provider reimbursement.  
28   Anti-managed care laws denote any-willing-provider (AWP), freedom-of-choice and direct-access regulation, 
designed to delineate the nature of provider-panels created by managed care firms. AWP regulation requires a 
managed care organization to include or contract with any provider who is willing to accept the terms of the net-
work. Freedom-of-choice and direct-access laws allow subscribers to obtain services from any licensed provider 
outside the network (at higher co-payments) or to bypass their gatekeeper (Jensen/ Morrisey 1999).  
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titatively as the portion of public spending on total health care expenditures. Under pub-
lic expenditures, tax funded programs as well as social insurance schemes are sub-
sumed.29 The private sources of health care financing comprise private health insurance, 
out-of-pocket payments, and other private funds such as charities – a source with some 
relevance in hospital funding in the US. Thus after a short presentation of the total level 
of health care spending in the American health care system (section 3.1), this section 
turns to the public/private mix, i.e. the structure of financing health care (section 3.2). 
Furthermore, a detailed picture of the role of the state in terms of financing is provided 
by an inter-sectoral comparison (section 3.3). The sectoral approach differentiates be-
tween inpatient (hospital) care, outpatient (ambulatory) health care, the dental health 
care sector and the pharmaceutical sector. Section 3.4 summarizes the results of the fi-
nancing dimension.  
3.1 The changing level of financing 
Total health care expenditure in the US increased from US$ 205 per capita in 1965 to 
US$ 6.100 in 2004 (OECD Health Data 2006). Over the same period, total expenditure 
in percentages of the GDP rose from 5.6% to 15.3%, which is the highest rate of all 
OECD countries30. The expenditure growth rate shows no linear progression; phases of 
accelerated growth and intermission can be observed instead. In addition, as we see 
from figure 2, some periods of expenditure growth like, for example, in 1981/82 and in 
2001 correspond with phases of economic recession31. Though in the other periods, 
health care cost measured as a share of GDP rose without changes in the denominator. 
                                                 
29  In other countries, like Germany or Austria, for example, social insurance contributions are associated with self-
governing autonomous collective actors (Rothgang/Cacace/Schmid 2006). This is not the case in the US, how-
ever. Therefore both tax funding and social insurance financing are considered jointly and attributed to the role of 
the state. 
30  The OECD average in 2004 was 8.8%. 
31  The phases of economic recession date to the years 1973–1975, 1980, 1981/82, 1990/91 and 2001 (NBER 2007). 
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Source: OECD Health Data 2006  
Until in the early 1980s, the growth of total health care expenditures was mainly fed by 
an increase in public expenditure caused by the introduction and the expansion of the 
public Medicare and Medicaid programs. Starting from 1983, when Diagnosis Related 
Groups (DRGs) were introduced in the Medicare program, public expenditure growth 
stagnated. But there were no long-run effects of DRGs on health care costs (Getzen 
2004: 391). Medicare and Medicaid expenditures steeply increased thereby consuming 
an ever-increasing share of the GDP. Thus the public programs have been the main 
driving force for an increase of total health expenditures in the beginning of the 1990s. 
Private expenditures, on the other hand, accelerated in the 1980s and remained almost 
constant from 1992 on, fluctuating around 7–7.5% of GDP and even shrinking occa-
sionally in absolute terms. The decade of the 1990s is marked by a rapid expansion of 
managed care in private health insurance followed by the inclusion of Medicaid benefi-
ciaries into private managed care plans. The observations therefore support the view 
that managed care had considerable effects on the containment of health care cost.32 
Starting with the economic shock in the aftermath of 9/11, total health expenditure 
again has risen rapidly in absolute terms and, due to a slow-down in economic growth, 
even more dramatically in relation to the GDP (CMS 2006). Cumulated over five years, 
between 2000 and 2005, premiums for family coverage have increased by 73% (!), 
compared with inflation growth of 14% and wage growth of 15%  (Kaiser/HRET 2005: 
                                                 
32  Managed care has been evaluated many times for its cost-containing and quality-related performance (see e.g. 
Miller/Luft 1997, Miller/Luft 2002). Most surveys concluded that they significantly reduced health care cost al-
though some of these savings may have been achieved by selecting subscriber groups with favourable risk-
structure (cream-skimming). The evidence about the quality of service provision is more mixed, however. For an 
overview of the cost and the quality issues in HMOs see e.g. Rich/Erb (2005) or Glied (2000).  
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1, cf. Kaiser/HRET 2006: 18). Hence, since the beginning of the new millennium the 
longest period of slow growth in health care expenditure has come to an end. 
3.2 Changes in the financing structure 
Before Medicare and Medicaid were introduced, only about 23% of total health expen-
diture came from public funds, mainly from taxes, while the overwhelming share in 
health care expenditure derived from private sources, especially out of pocket (45% in 
1965). At that point in time, only some minor programs, i.e. workers’ compensation and 
temporary disability insurance were financed by some sort of social insurance contribu-
tion (CMS 2006).  
 Figure 3 illustrates that with the implementation and expansion of Medicare and 
Medicaid, the public/private mix of financing health care in the US underwent a funda-
mental change. Public tax financing and social insurance financing increased considera-
bly while private expenditures decreased correspondingly. The Medicare program gave 
considerable rise in social insurance funding thereby enforcing a principle that was 
hardly established in the American health care system.  
Figure 3: Public and private financing as a percentage of total health care financing 
























Source:  OECD Health Data 2006 
The effects of the implementation of the public programs and an initial expansion phase 
resulting from the inclusion of disabled persons in the Medicare program lasted until 
around 1975. By 1975 public funding covered 41% of all health care expenditure, after 
which it levelled off, remaining relatively stable until it started increasing again in the 
early 1990s. The new flow of public funds mainly accrues to the tax-financed Medicaid 
program, and reflects several changes in the program features. The peaking poverty rate 
around 1993, the payments made to disproportionate share hospitals (DSH)33, and the 
                                                 
33  In the DSH program service providers are remunerated more generously for their services Medicaid payments 
since they serve a higher number of uninsured or underinsured patients than the average hospital, which serve a 
disproportionate share of Medicaid or low-income patients. 
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set-up of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in 1997 contributed to 
this increase (Kaiser Commission 2002). In 2004, almost 45% of health care expendi-
ture came from public sources. About 32% of total health care expenditure was tax-
financed; 12.5 % derived from social insurance contribution. 
This picture changes, when tax exemptions are considered through which the federal 
government subsidises private employer-sponsored insurance. The practice of providing 
tax subsidies is not unusual within the OECD world, though it is quantitatively much 
more important in the US than in other countries (Adema/Ladaique 2005, Hacker 2002). 
It is estimated that in 2006 the federal government has spent about US$ 133 billion (US 
OMB 2006), which is about 1% of the projected GDP of that year, in federal tax de-
ductibles as subsidies to employer-sponsored health insurance programs.34 The OECD 
health data categorize the tax exemptions under private health care spending. As Wool-
handler and Himmelstein (2002) emphasize, this assignment is incorrect as the subsidies 
are forgone tax revenues and therefore levied from public sources. Their re-calculation 
(see second line in figure 4) shows that this amount is quite substantial. 
Figure 4: Diverging estimates of public health expenditures (in % of total exp.) 
Year 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
OECD 2006 22.7 36.5 41.1 41.3 39.8 39.7 45.3 43.8 
W&H 2002 30.7 44.4 51.0 55.4 54.6 55.1 61.2 59.8 
Source: OECD Health Data (2006), Woolhandler/Himmelstein (2002)  
According to these results, the public share started to surpass its private counterpart as 
early as 1975. The disparity between the estimates and the official figures widens over 
time. In 1999, almost 60% of total health expenditures came from public funds as com-
pared to 44% reported by the OECD on the basis of national statistics. Hence, the role 
of the state in financing health care is considerably higher than is commonly assumed 
(Docteur/Suppanz/Woo 2003, Hacker 2002, Stone 2000). If this funding structure is 
then divided “tri-chotomously” into tax financing (45%), social insurance contribution 
(15%) and private financing (40%), US health care will be predominately tax-funded. 
Therefore it is not appropriate to call the US a private system with respect to financing 
today.  
When recalling figure 3 we see a second remarkable trend in US health care financ-
ing; this time as an interesting shift within private financing. Although private insurance 
funding reacted to the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid with a temporary drop, it 
                                                 
34  By comparison, federal governments’ spending on Medicare was about US$ 309 billion in 2004 and US$ 173 
billion on Medicaid. The co-financing of the states in the Medicaid program accounted for US$ 120 billion in 
2004 (CMS 2006). Therefore, as Iglehart (1999) has already stated in 1999, tax expenditures make up the third 
largest federal health program after Medicare and Medicaid.  
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soon recovered, assuming a constantly growing share in health care financing. Thus at 
the same time when public funds have accounted for an ever increasing portion of the 
health care bill, private insurance financing also expanded and out-of-pocket payments 
declined (Levit/Freeland/Waldo 1990). Beginning in the 1970s and accelerated through 
the spread of managed care from the mid-1980s on, private insurance started to widen 
the scope of benefits and tighten requirements for out-of-pocket payments. While pri-
vate insurance made up 25% of total health care financing in 1965, this figure had risen 
to 37% by 2004. Out-of-pocket payments for health care decreased from a high 45% in 
1965 to about 30% in 1975 and down to 13.2% in 2004. This out-pocket-rate is remark-
able as it is lower than Canada for example (14.9%) and even slightly below Denmark 
(13.9) (OECD Health Data 2006).  
In sum, this means a considerable rise in collective financing through both, the public 
programs and private insurance financing as well. These quantitative data, however, 
have to be read with caution as they do not reflect the degree of solidarity achieved by 
collective financing in the US health care system. More precisely, solidarity in private 
health insurance financing is restricted as premium calculation, within some limits set 
by the federal and states’ governments, follows the principle of risk-equivalence (ex-
perience-rating) and therefore implies only minimal re-distributional effects.  
3.3 Intersectoral comparison  
In order to investigate the trends described above in greater depth, public spending in 
the inpatient and the outpatient as well as the dental and the pharmaceutical sector will 
be examined separately here. At the beginning of our observation period, the role of the 
government in financing is rather modest in all sectors, but it is most prominent in the 
sector which consumes most resources, i.e. in inpatient care. In 1965, the public expen-
diture constituted about 37% of total expenditure in the inpatient sector, as compared to 
6% in outpatient care (CMS 2006). Public financing at this time was of almost no quan-
titative relevance in either the pharmaceutical (2.4%) or in the dental health care sector 
(1.2%). 
In the inpatient health care sector the public/private mix altered fundamentally when 
Medicaid and Medicare were introduced. Public expenditure rose from 37% (1965) to 
about 55% of total inpatient care expenditure in 1975. In the 1990s a second leap is ob-
servable, augmenting the public share by another 5% to over 60% of total inpatient care 
expenditure. From the mid-1990s onwards this trend halted, and public financing of 
inpatient care fluctuated henceforward at around the 60% margin until 1997 but fell 
from then on to 57% in 2004. Out-of-pocket payments fell from 24% in 1965 to 7.4% in 
2004.  
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Figure 5: Public and private financing in the health care sectors 







































































































Source: Centers for  Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS 2006): Health Accounts35  
Inpatient care is the costliest of all health care sectors, consuming a large part of the 
financial resources. Bearing in mind that the public share in total health expenditure 
was 45% in 2004 (OECD Health Data 2006), we can clearly identify a disproportionate 
share of public financing allocated to the inpatient sector. In addition, the inpatient sec-
tor is the only one in which public expenditure exceeds private financing today. Thus 
the state assumed (and has always had), the strongest role in that sector. 
The growth rate of public financing was even more dramatic in the outpatient sector. 
From 1965 to 1975 public expenditure had expanded from 6% to 25% of outpatient 
spending, followed by a more or less constant increase throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
amounting to 31% in 2004. Out-of-pocket payments fell from 68% to about 18% in 
1995 within a span of thirty years and have continued to decline slightly until today.  
Compared to all other sectors, public expenditure is lowest in dental health care. This 
is most plausible as routine dental care procedures are not covered under Medicare, nor 
are dental care services in general included in the basic Medicaid package. The public 
                                                 
35  Please note that tax exemptions, which effectively are public expenditures, also are included in private financing 
in the CMS data sets. 
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share nevertheless rose from 1.2% in 1965 to 6 % in 2004. At the same time there was a 
considerable increase in private insurance financing, particularly between the mid-1970s 
and the mid-1990s. Again, we find a remarkable decline in out-of-pocket payments, 
which can largely be explained by the penetration of managed care plans into the mar-
ket. In contrast to traditional private indemnity insurance, managed care health plans 
regularly include dental care procedures in their benefit packages. Out-of-pocket expen-
diture dropped steeply from 97% in 1965 to 44% in 2004.  
The pharmaceutical sector was least affected by the introduction of Medicare and 
Medicaid, as no outpatient drug coverage was included in Medicare, for example, when 
the program was established. In the Medicaid program, prescription drugs are an op-
tional benefit. Nevertheless, public drug expenditures rose steadily over the period un-
der investigation. They grew from a low 2.4% in 1965 to 15% in 1995 and reached al-
most 24% in 2004. We see, therefore, that the pharmaceutical sector was influenced less 
by the introduction of the public programs than by their expansion over time, especially 
over the last decade. Private insurance financing steeply increased, especially beginning 
from the 1990s, and amounted to about 41% in 2004, while out-of-pocket financing fell 
from over 95% in 1965 to 35% in 2004. Depending on the further development of the 
new Medicare drug benefit (see MMA in section 1.2), Medicare funding is expected to 
increase and individuals’ out-of-pocket and Medicaid spending to decline in the coming 
years (Kaiser Foundation 2006, Heffler/Smith/Keehan et al. 2005).  
3.4 The changing role of the state in financing 
To sum up this analysis for the financing dimension, there is a strong increase in public 
involvement in the US health care system from the beginning of the observation period 
in 1965 onwards. This flow of public funds into the system is largely due to the public 
Medicare and Medicare programs, but also a result of constantly rising tax exemptions 
to the benefit of private, employer-sponsored health insurance. Therefore, it is no longer 
appropriate to label the American health care system a private system with respect to 
financing but rather a “mixed system” (Marmor 2006, Oberlander 2002). This finding 
implies a considerable blurring of the financing system, especially as with the social 
insurance contributions an almost completely new element of health care financing en-
tered the American health care system. 
Private insurance financing also increased which means that collective financing 
through both public and private insurance led to a considerable decline in out-of-pocket 
payments in all health care sectors. This development was supported by the diffusion of 
managed care arrangements seeking competitive advantages (Gabel/Ginsburg/Picker-
eign et al. 2001). With HMOs and their followers penetrating the private market, benefit 
packages became more comprehensive and cost sharing declined. Thus, taking devel-
opments from the mid-1960s on into consideration, a “privatization of risks” (Hacker 
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2004) in purely quantitative terms is not observed for the financing of the American 
health care system.  
But these quantitative data do not reflect the fact that insurance protection leaves se-
vere gaps in coverage. In addition, as mentioned before, the solidarity-aspect of private 
health insurance financing needs to be questioned. What is more, due to high total 
health care spending in the US, even low out-of-pocket payment rates equal relatively 
high absolute amounts. All these aspects, however, are dealt with in the regulation di-
mension, especially in the regulation of coverage and the financing system in sections 
5.1 and 5.2. This brings us back to the necessity to explore all three dimensions simul-
taneously, i.e. the financing, the service provision and the regulation of the health care 
system. 
4. THE SERVICE PROVISION DIMENSION 
Service provision is the second dimension which is measured quantitatively. Yet there is 
no straight way to quantify the role of the state in the delivery of services over all sec-
tors (Rothgang/Cacace/Schmid 2006). Therefore we first measure the size and the pub-
lic/private mix in each sector, i.e. in the hospital sector, the nursing home sector, the 
outpatient sector, the dental health care sector, and the pharmaceutical sector (section 
4.1). The most appropriate measurement approach, which allows for comparison among 
the sectors at the same time, is to use monetary terms. Monetary data indicate the flow 
of funds into the health care sectors thereby explaining the changing size of the respec-
tive sector over time. In a second step, data on the public and private responsibility in 
each sector are used to describe the changing the public/private mix (section 4.2). In 
order to combine data on the size of the sectors with the information on its pub-
lic/private mix, an indicator (Public Service Provision Index = PPI) is provided in the 
concluding section (section 4.3). 
4.1 The size of the health care sectors  
During the whole study period, most monetary resources are absorbed by the hospital 
sector (CMS 2006). From 1965 up to a turning point the percentage of total health ex-
penditures allocated to the hospital sector rapidly increased from about 40% in 1965 to 
48% in 1982. This turning point is clearly marked by the introduction of the DRG-based 
payment system for hospital care. The share subsequently decreased as quickly as it 
rose, eventually arriving at 37% of monetary resources in 2004 (see figure 6). Corre-
spondingly, the monetary resources allocated to the outpatient sector remained constant 
at a few percentage points below the 30% margin and increased from the early 1980s 
on.  
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Figure 6:  Percentages of monetary resource flows in all sectors36 
 
Source: CMS 2006, own calculation 
The nursing home sectors’ relevance increased during the study period, fostered by 
demographic changes. Between 1965 and 1980 the percentage of monetary resources 
devoted to that sector doubled from 4% to 9%. From 1998 on, the point in time when 
DRGs were introduced also for the nursing home sector (cf. CMS 2003c) the share de-
creased to 7% in 2004. Monetary resources allocated to the dental care sector remained 
stable at 7%–8% of total until the late-1970s and then started to decline, eventually 
reaching 5% in 2004. The percentage of resources allocated to the pharmaceutical sector 
sharply declined from 21% in 1965 to about 12% in the mid-1990s. From 1995 to 2004, 
however, the percentage of monetary resources spent on pharmaceuticals rose again 
rapidly to 16%. Due to price increases and higher consumption levels, prescription 
drugs have represented a rapidly growing cost component in service delivery (Doc-
teur/Suppanz/Woo 2003).  
The introduction of the DRG-based prospective payment system (PPS) in Medicare 
had a major impact on the two largest sectors in terms of resource flows, i.e. the hospital 
and the outpatient sector. In the hospital sector, rates were forced down and procedures 
that have been performed on an inpatient basis have been moved to outpatient settings. 
At the time of their introduction DRGs uniquely applied to Medicare patients but as 
Medicare is almost a “monopsony buyer” (Ruggie 1992: 932) of inpatient care, the bulk 
of the hospital care procedures fell under the PPS. Medicaid and private insurers fol-
lowed the Medicare example and introduced DRGs in the 1990s (Raffel/Raffel 1997, 
Getzen 2004). The spread of managed care, too, gave rise to a shift from inpatient 
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treatment to the less costly outpatient sector (Kronenfeld 2002, Levit/Lazenby/Braden et 
al. 1997). Prior authorization requirements for hospital stays, most common in managed 
care, provoked efforts to provide care in the most appropriate setting. Hence, over time 
relatively less monetary resources were directed into the inpatient and more to the out-
patient sector. 
Correspondingly, the total number of inpatient beds37 decreased from 8.8 beds per 
1,000 of population in 1965 to 3.6 beds in the year 2000, which is one of the lowest 
inpatient bed ratios in the OECD world (Docteur/Oxley 2003). The average length of 
stay for patients fell sharply and procedures that have been performed on an inpatient 
basis were moved to outpatient settings (AHA/Lewin 2006). At the same time, there 
was an almost linear increase in employment in the hospital sector, growing between 
1965 and 2000 from 10.1 to 16.2 employed persons per 1,000 of population. The de-
crease in the number of inpatient beds should therefore not conceal the fact that the hos-
pital sector is still expanding in terms of employment. With the spread of managed care 
and the resulting competitive pressure, hospitals were forced to deploy their personal 
resources more efficiently. Thus efficiency, measured as the ratio of full time equivalent 
per admission38, has improved from the early 1990s on, a period marked by rapid in-
creases in managed care (Kaiser Foundation 2004). But this measure has to be read with 
caution as the DRG-based payment system provides an incentive to discharge patients 
early and to re-admit them in case of complications thereby rising the number of admis-
sions. 
In the outpatient medical sector, the number of practicing physicians increased from 
1.3 per 1,000 of population in 1975 to 2.4 in 2004 which is below the OECD average 
(2.9) (DHHS 2006, OECD Health Data 2006). The increase in the number of dentists 
and pharmacists was less substantial. In 1980 there were 0.5 practising dentists per 
1,000 of population as compared to 0.6 in 2000. Over the same period the number of 
pharmacists rose from 0.6 per 1,000 of the population to 0.7 (OECD Health Data 2006). 
4.2 The public/private mix in the health care sectors  
Having gathered the information on the size of the respective sectors and its changes 
over time, the next step is to describe the changing public/private mix in each health 
care sector. Coming first to the hospital sector, we distinguish according to the owner-
ship of facilities between public, private non-profit and private for-profit hospitals.  
                                                 
37  American Hospital Association (AHA): Hospital Statistics, several years. Data include acute care and long-term 
care beds in hospitals and exclude nursing homes and a small number of non-federal hospitals which are not reg-
istered within the AHA.  
38  See AHA (2000: Appendices) for this concept of measuring efficiency. 
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In 2004 the AHA counted 5,759 acute care hospitals with about 956,000 inpatient 
beds in the US (AHA/Lewin 2006). Over all ownership status, most hospital beds, i.e. 
about 85%, are owned by hospitals operating at the community level.39 The following 
figure provides with information on the changing number of inpatient beds (figure 7a) 
and also on the corresponding market share according to ownership (figure 7b). 
Figure 7: Beds according to ownership (1975-2003) 
  
Source: DHHS (2006), American Hospital Association (AHA 2000, AHA 2006a, AHA/Lewin 2006), own calculation.40 
Turning now to the role of the state in hospital care provision, the share of inpatient 
beds in public ownership in relation to total hospital beds serves as an indicator. In-
cluded in the number of public hospital beds are all federal, state and local inpatient 
beds.41  
The public share declined from 32% of all hospital beds in 1975 to about 20% in 
2004 (see figure 7b). An accelerated decrease is observable over the past ten years. 
Throughout the observation period, most inpatient beds are owned by private non-profit 
hospitals. In 1975, private non-profit beds accounted for about 60% of all inpatient 
beds. Although the absolute number of beds in non-profit ownership decreased, this 
                                                 
39  Community hospitals as defined by the AHA are all non-federal, short-term general and special hospitals whose 
facilities and services are available to the public. 
40  The percentages (figure 7b) are adjusted by omitting missing values. The DHHS/AHA data do not explain the 
ownership status of all registered inpatient beds; nevertheless, quality of data improves over time. While for the 
year 1975 ownership data are available for only about 75% of all inpatient beds, in 2003, the ownership of almost 
90% of all inpatient beds is explained. 
41  As they traditionally respond to local needs, most public hospitals are located at the state and local community 
level. There are, however, also some hospitals owned by federal government institutions like e.g. the military 
hospitals operated by the Department of the Army or by the Department of Veterans Affairs. The number of fed-
eral hospitals also includes a few prison hospitals and inpatient beds operated by the US Public Health Service. 






1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000






1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
private non-profit 
public beds 
private for-profit private for-profit 
public beds
total inpatient beds 
private non-profit
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 58) 
- 25 - 
type of hospital was able to expand its market share to 66% in 2004. During the same 
period the number of beds in private for-profit ownership expanded from 7% to 13% 
while their absolute number remained almost constant (see figure 7a).  
These numbers reflect a fundamental and ongoing change in the American hospital 
industry as a response both: market requirements and government policies. In the light 
of increasing market competition following the growth of managed care, government 
sold out its municipal hospitals (Getzen 2004). Remarkably, however, not only the mar-
ket, but also the government played a role in creating this environment by shifting the 
beneficiaries of the public programs into managed care and through the introduction of 
DRGs in the Medicare program. Thus in the 1980s there was an increasing concern that 
a few, very large commercial suppliers will dominate the hospital industry (Döhler 
1990). But this expectation did not come true because in order to secure a minimum 
treatment of the uninsured and those unable to pay, government supports the non-profit 
hospitals by providing tax subsidies (Andrews 2005; see also section 5.4). Therefore, it 
happened not only that non-profit provider converted into for-profit companies, but also 
the other way round (Scott/Ruef/Mendel et al. 2000). Hence, non-profit service provi-
sion still prevails in the US hospital market today, although the market share of private 
for-profit hospitals is on the increase.  
Unfortunately, for the nursing home sector no comparable data on inpatient beds ex-
ists. From the CMS data we know that the portion of private for-profit providers is con-
siderably higher than in the hospital sector and public provision is only about 5% today 
(CMS 2003 b).  
Turning now to the outpatient sector, the public/private mix is determined by the 
employment status of providers. By definition, self-employed outpatient physicians are 
considered as private providers.42 But, strictly speaking, not all physicians in the US can 
be categorized as outpatient providers, and not all physicians are self-employed. A small 
percentage (less than 3%) of physicians are inpatient care providers, as e.g. those em-
ployed full time in hospitals by the federal government or in university hospitals (AHA 
2006b, Graig 1999). Nevertheless, most physicians are outpatient care providers. In 
these settings, physicians can be self-employed or employed under salary, like e.g. in a 
HMO. The number of physicians working on a salary is considerable: in physician-
owned practices and in HMOs, the share of employed US physicians increased from 
24% in 1984 to more than 35% today.43 But since both, HMOs and group practices are 
private organizations it is justified to consider the employed physicians as private enti-
                                                 
42  Compare Rothgang/Cacace/Schmid (2006) to this concept.  
43  See Graig (1999) and AMA (2006) (own calculations). 
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ties, too. The fact that all (outpatient) dentists and pharmacists are also private providers 
allows the conclusion that outpatient service provision as a whole is private. 
4.3 The changing role of the state in service provision 
In order to fully assess the changing role of the state it is necessary to combine the sec-
tor-specific data by generating a formula for an assessment of the role of the state over 
all sectors. For this purpose, we suggest a Public Service Provision Index (PPI)44, which 
results when multiplying the share of monetary resources allocated to each sector with 
its respective public and private shares of service provision in percentages. By doing 
this over a period of several years, we obtain one condensed indicator for the role of the 
state over all sectors and its change over time. 
In 1975 the PPI was 15%, which means that 15% of overall service delivery were 
public and 85% private at that point in time. This indicates an already low level of pub-
lic involvement in service delivery at the time our data series starts. Public service pro-
vision was highest in inpatient hospital care, a sector that entered the computed indica-
tor with the strongest weight since most monetary resources were allocated to it.  
In the first decade from 1975 to the mid-1980s, the monetary resources directed to 
the hospital sector increased. But this increase was not sufficient to over-compensate the 
direct retreat of the state from service provision, which resulted in the first instance 
from decreasing numbers of inpatient beds in public ownership. Thus the computed 
indicator shifted to 12% in 1985 indicating a slow but constant retreat of the state. From 
the mid-1980s on, caused by the introduction of the Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) 
and the spread of managed care, the size of the hospital sector declined and relatively 
fewer resources were devoted to it. These developments had major effects on the pub-
lic/private mix as resource flows were re-directed from the inpatient sector, where the 
state played at least a certain role, to the outpatient sector, which is entirely private. 
Thus while the direct retreat of the state from service provision continued; it was en-
forced by an implicit retreat due to the withdrawal of resources. In sum, both effects in 
combination led to an acceleration of the observed phenomenon ending up with a PPI of 
only 8% in 2004, thereby clearly indicating a retreat of the state in service provision. 
5. THE REGULATION DIMENSION 
In the first two dimensions the role of the state was measured directly as the public 
share in financing and service provision respectively. We now come to the third aspect 
of the role of the state, namely the regulation dimension. Here the relationships between 
the three main actors in health care systems are relevant: the service providers, the fi-
nancing bodies, and the (potential) beneficiaries (see figure 8).  
                                                 
44  Compare Rothgang/Cacace/Schmid (2006) to this concept.  
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Source: Rothgang/Cacace/Grimmeisen et al. (2005: 3), own adaptation  
Six relationships between the main actors of health care systems are to be examined. 
First, we need to ask who regulates the relationship between the financing bodies and 
the (potential) beneficiaries. Within this relationship, the regulation of health care cov-
erage (4.1) and the financing system (4.2) are discussed. In the relation between service 
providers and financing bodies, the question is who regulates the remuneration system 
(4.3) and the access of service providers to the health care market (4.4). In the last rela-
tionship, i.e. between service providers and beneficiaries (or patients), we assess who 
regulates the access of patients to providers (4.5) and the content of the benefit pack-
age (4.6).  
5.1 Coverage 
Starting with the relation between (potential) beneficiaries and financing agencies, we 
first examine who is responsible for coverage decisions and the inclusion of further sec-
tions of the population. It is important to note that in our concept coverage refers to the 
percentage of the population covered (head counts), and not to the question of compre-
hensiveness of the benefit package (see section 5.6). For an investigation of the role of 
the state it is not only relevant to ascertain whether it assumes the task of providing 
coverage directly through public programs, but also to what extent the state regulates 
coverage in private insurance. Figure 8 provides an overview of the most relevant forms 
of coverage in the US health care system.45   
                                                 
45  Due to double coverage, the figures based on US Census data do not add up to 100%. Double coverage occurs for 
example when persons eligible for Medicare are poor and therefore also receive Medicaid benefits. Some indi-
viduals covered by employer-sponsored insurance are eligible for Medicare at the same time.  
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Figure 9: Health insurance coverage in % of total population 
  1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Medicare 0a 10 a 12 a 13 a 13 a 13 13 14 14
Medicaid 10 12 11 13public  insurance total government  25 26 25 27
total private 72 b 78 b 83 b 82 b 76 b 73 70 72 68private  
insurance empl.-based 60 61 64 60
total covered  86 85 86 84
uninsured46  14 15 14 16
Sources: a) CMS (2006), own calculation b) HIAA (2002). All data from 1990 on collected by the US Census Bu-
reau (2006: 21)   
Medicare and Medicaid have undergone a series of major inclusion processes since their 
inception (Holahan/Weil/Wiener 2003, Weissert/Weissert 2003, Patel/Rushefsky 1999). 
After Medicare was set up for the aged in 1965, the federal government in 1973 incor-
porated disabled people and most people with end-stage renal disease into the program. 
As the percentage of people aged 65 or older increased from 9.5% of total population in 
1966 to 12.3% in 2002, the proportion of the population covered by Medicare rose cor-
respondingly.  
In the Medicaid program, the federal government sets the general guidelines for deci-
sions on coverage, as e.g. the federal poverty line (FPL) as a reference parameter for 
eligibility, and leaves a certain degree of discretion to the states. The federal state fur-
thermore determines which groups of the population have to be included in the Medi-
caid program and which groups may optionally be included.47 Individual states may de-
cide to expand Medicaid coverage and receive federal matching funds on an open-end 
basis as far as federal criteria are met. Additionally, individual states may set up their 
own general assistance programs, which is one explanation for the considerable dispari-
ties in health care coverage between the states48. Starting in the early 1990s, the federal 
government mandated to cover certain groups of children. But President Clintons’ wel-
fare reform of 1996 also caused some reductions in eligibility (Weissert/Weissert 2002). 
The most noteworthy expansion of Medicaid occurred in 1997 with the BBA, when the 
federal government mandated states to extend public coverage systematically to low-
                                                 
46  According to the US Census Bureau people are considered “uninsured” if they were not covered by any type of 
health insurance at any time in the previous calendar year. Therefore health insurance coverage is likely to be un-
derreported as compared with other national surveys (US Census Bureau  2006: 20, 59). 
47  For this purpose the federal government defines the “categorically needy” groups of the population. These are 
further split into a “mandatory needy” group consisting mainly of parents and children, pregnant women and 
some Medicare beneficiaries who must be covered, and an “optionally needy” eligibility group. The optionally 
needy group includes individuals to whom states may extend Medicaid eligibility.  
48  A comparison across states shows that Texas (25.1%) and New Mexico (21.4%) had the highest proportions of 
uninsured, while Minnesota (8.5) had the lowest (3-year average 2002-2004) (US Census Bureau  2006). 
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income children through the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) 
(Quadagno 2005). Some expansion in Medicaid coverage though, has been offset 
(“crowded out”) by reductions in employer-sponsored coverage for families and by a 
contraction of other state programs (Stone 2000). Moreover, not all Medicaid/SCHIP 
eligible persons de facto draw on the programs, due to administrative hurdles (Reinhardt 
2005: 109). 
Major inclusion processes into the private insurance scheme date back to the time 
during and after World War II. In this era, employers started to offer health insurance as 
a “fringe benefit” when mandated wage stops restricted their means of attracting and 
rewarding employees (Döhler 1990). Today, employers’ decision to offer coverage is 
highly dependent on the premium costs49 and on economic performance in general (Cut-
ler 2002). Therefore this inclusion process is stagnating and employer-based coverage is 
declining.50 If no employer-sponsored coverage is available, individuals may decide to 
buy insurance based on individual contracts. Within this system, good risks have an 
incentive not to seek coverage and bad risks may face difficulties to receive coverage 
because insurers are allowed to deny contracts for severely ill persons (Ca-
cace/Rothgang/Thompson 2007). Thus only a small percentage of less than 9% of the 
population has private coverage based on individual contracts.  
The number of uninsured increased in recent years. In order to mitigate this adverse 
effect, most states have established high-risk pools for covering those who are otherwise 
hard to insure (Docteur/Suppanz/Woo 2003). Those without insurance have access to 
emergency care through hospitals, which are legally bound to provide at least minimal 
treatment (see EMTALA of 1985 in section 5.5). In addition, non-profit hospitals have 
to provide charity care in exchange for their tax-exempt status. If the patient is not able 
to pay the hospital bill, the costs for the treatment provided are either borne by the hos-
pital or shifted to other patients with more generous insurance (Getzen 2004, 
Giaimo/Manow 1999).   
In 1985, through COBRA, the federal government forced private insurers to provide 
coverage for employees who lost or quit their job under the condition of group health 
benefits during a transition period. Yet, the law only applies to plans that are sponsored 
by employers with more than 20 employees. Moreover, the duration of COBRA plans is 
restricted51, and the insured has to pay the full costs (102%) out of his/her own pocket. 
                                                 
49  Since 2000, premiums for family insurance coverage have increased by 73%, compared with an inflation growth 
of 14% and wage growth of 15% (Kaiser/ HRET 2005: 1). 
50  Within the past six years, the percentage of firms offering health benefits declined from 69% to 61% in 2006 
(Kaiser/HRET 2006: 34). 
51  From 18 months in case of loss of employment to a maximum of 36 months if there is a change in family status. 
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From 1996 on, HIPAA further enabled portability and the continuation of group insur-
ance. Essentially, HIPAA precludes insurers from imposing pre-existing condition52 
clauses on new employees, prohibits discrimination against individual group members 
based on health status, and requires insurers to make insurance available to certain indi-
viduals who lost group coverage and exhausted their COBRA (Quadagno 2005, Pol-
litz/Tapay/Hadley et al. 2000). Another, less obvious but most influential, public policy 
to govern private insurance coverage is the tax-exempted status assigned to employer-
sponsored health plans (Hacker 2004: 245). 
Summing up the regulation of coverage most briefly, the role of the state definitely 
increased during the past four decades. The state offers coverage to the aged and the 
indigent, and it regulates and subsidizes private insurance. Nevertheless, it is far away 
from the notion of a “strong state”. The provision of tax exemptions is a rather weak, 
incentive based and market conform instrument as compared to other means of regulat-
ing coverage e.g. through mandating universal insurance. Thus, although the state has 
been an important actor in providing coverage for the most expensive health risks, pri-
vate employers are the main actors when it comes to coverage decisions.  
5.2 Financing system  
In order to assess the role of the state in the regulation of the financing system, we need 
to establish who regulates premiums, premium increases and co-payments in health in-
surance. Again, the role of the state cannot be fully comprehended by merely analyzing 
government programs; it is also necessary to examine how federal and/or state govern-
ment regulation affects private insurance. 
The regulation of premiums and co-payments53 in the Medicare program falls within 
the authority of the federal government, more precisely the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) (Marmor 2000). Part A of the Medicare program (hospital 
insurance) is an obligatory program funded by payroll tax contributions paid half by 
employees and half by employers. The premium rate is fixed by law; since 1986 the 
contributions count 2.9% of the taxable wage base. When Part A was introduced, a ceil-
                                                 
52  Pre-existing conditions are physical or mental conditions already existing before an insurer agrees to insure an 
individual. Some insurers also refuse to cover pre-existing conditions, require waiting times for their treatment or 
completely deny coverage for an applicant.  
53  Under the Medicare program, co-payments are increasingly required to cover costs. In 2003 hospitalized patients 
were charged US$ 840 per episode of up to 60 days, and between US$ 210 and US$ 420 for the next 30-60 or 
more days respectively (Green Book 2004). Physicians, within boundaries, are allowed to charge Medicare pa-
tients for medical services not covered by or in excess of the Medicare program (Reinhardt 2005: 90). For a com-
parison of cost-sharing requirements under Medicaid, Medicare and a private Blue Cross/ Blue Shield Plan, see 
Kaiser Commission (2002a: 68ff). 
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ing was imposed on premium rate. In 1991 the federal government lifted this ceiling and 
in 1994 abandoned it altogether thereby allowing for a considerable inflow of funds into 
the program (Hoffman/Klees/Curtis 2000). Medicare Part B (supplementary medical 
insurance) is an optional program that covers outpatient care. Part B is partly financed  
through monthly premiums54 (2006: 78.20 US$ p.m.) with subsidies from general tax 
revenues. The federal government has regulated the level of subsidization since the pro-
gram began. Today, premiums cover 25% of the cost of the program, with general gov-
ernment revenues covering the remaining 75% (Green Book 2004). In addition, since 
the OBRA of 1990, the federal government also regulates the private Medigap insur-
ance market by imposing requirements on the standardization of plans and restrictions 
on the exclusion of risks (Keen/Light/Mays 2001, Kruse 1997).  
In Medicaid and SCHIP, the federal government gives states the option to receive 
funds, the so-called federal medical assistance percentages (FMAP), if they structure 
their programs along federal guidelines. The federal government matches state spending 
on an open-end basis, i.e. the more a state spends on Medicaid or SCHIP, the more it 
can receive. The FMAP in the Medicaid program varies between a minimum of 50% 
and 77% and is adjusted annually in line with the average state citizens’ per capita in-
come. In general, higher matching rates up to 83% are achieved within the SCHIP pro-
gram. The federal government leaves decisions on cost sharing under Medicaid to the 
discretion of the states, but it puts restrictions on co-payments and even prohibits states 
from imposing any form of cost sharing on specific population groups (Kaiser Commis-
sion 2002: 64).  
In private insurance, the insurers set premiums and also decide on cost sharing ele-
ments. As no risk-equalization scheme is established in the US health care system, the 
private insurance industry faces enormous adverse selection problems (Ca-
cace/Rothgang/Thompson 2007).55 Insurers, therefore, deploy a great deal of resources 
                                                 
54  Additionally, an annual deductible of 110 US$ applies. The most recent changes in the Part B program entail a 
means-test, which requires a small percentage of high-income beneficiaries to pay higher premiums. 
55   A risk-equalization scheme shifts premium incomes from health insurers with good structures to those with bad 
structures.  This, for example, is established in the German statutory insurance for levelling off the different risk 
structures of the sickness funds in order to restore competition and to prevent adverse selection. Adverse selection 
occurs when an insurer is not able to rate the health risk of the applicants. In this case the insurer will calculate 
the insurance premium based on an average risk expectation. This average premium will attract relatively poor 
risks and deter the good health risks. If poor risks join the pool, however, the insurer will be forced to increase the 
premium and good risks will be further deterred. This process can repeat itself with the consequence of a break-
down of the insurance market. 
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in order to adjust premium rates to accommodate pre-existing conditions. As a conse-
quence, premiums for single individuals may be prohibitively high.  
In employer-sponsored health insurance, premiums in general are calculated based 
on experience rating56, where premiums reflect the average risk structure of one specific 
employee group. This was not the case in times when non-profit insurers dominated the 
market place as they were forced to apply community rating in the calculation of premi-
ums. As the method of community rating resembled more a social than a private insur-
ance scheme, the element of solidarity was enforced (Enthoven/Fuchs 2006). This prin-
ciple, however, had to be abandoned due to competitive pressures from the fast-growing 
for profit insurance industry. Consequently, the risk-pools became increasingly frag-
mented and the re-distributional effects declined (cf. Hacker 2004). 
Small employers are not able to spread risk over many employees and therefore may 
face prohibitively high premiums if their staffs comprise severely ill employees. Those 
employers who offer insurance, have considerable influence on insurance premiums and 
substantial scope for bargaining especially when they are large or if they are represented 
by one of the powerful employer-associations (Keen/Light/Mays 2001). One of the 
most influential factors on private insurance premium rates was the competitive market 
forces triggered by the introduction of managed care. Managed care arrangements com-
peted with traditional indemnity insurers on lower premium cost and less cost sharing 
requirement. But the beneficial effect of competition as to be seen in decreasing prices 
also brought some major disadvantages, especially for firms with unfavorable risk struc-
ture and for individuals with high health risks.  
The regulation of the private insurance business is delegated from the federal to the 
states’ governments. The states’ activity was low at the beginning of our observation 
period, but from the mid-1980s onwards, the premium increase and risk-adjustment 
practices in employer-sponsored health insurance have increasingly been regulated57 
                                                 
56  Experience-rated premiums in employer-sponsored insurance are based on the average actual or expected use of 
health care services of that specific employee group. The alternative method of premium calculation is community 
rating based on the experienced health care needs of the population of a given geographic area (see also section 
2.2). As a consequence of competitive pressure from experience rated plans, community rating today is the ex-
ception.  
57  States require private insurers to hold a financial reserve to minimize the risk of insolvency, to contribute to state 
guarantee funds to cover the payments of insolvent insurers, and to establish high-risk pools to cover the other-
wise hard to insure (Docteur/Suppanz/Woo 2003, Acs/Long/Marquis et al. 1996). In addition, some states also in-
fluence the content of the benefit package of single health plans and the types of providers to be mandatorily in-
cluded (GAO 1996). Nearly every state has passed legislation to improve portability, access, and rating practices 
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(Jensen/Morrisey 1999, Jost 2001). In addition, at the federal level, government re-
stricted insurers’ ability to exclude pre-existing conditions through HIPAA in 1996 (Jost 
2001). Nevertheless, individual states regulate insurance business to varying degrees. It 
should also be borne in mind that the federal government prevents states from effec-
tively regulating employer-sponsored health insurance due to ERISA. Thus in general 
“neither federal nor the states governments have exerted much influence on the private 
insurance market” (Stone 2000: 956).   
In conclusion, the federal and the state governments regulate the financing system in 
all publicly funded programs and they also prevent the exclusion of risks in the private 
Medigap market. In private insurance, however, with the countervailing effects of in-
creased state-based regulation and federal deregulation, government fell well short of its 
potential. Thus private insurers are given a relatively free rein in setting their premiums 
according to market requirements and powerful employers are able to bargain on pre-
mium prices. Important changes in premium amounts and in cost-sharing requirements 
can be attributed to the spread of managed care, which triggered a fierce price competi-
tion in the insurance market.  
5.3 Remuneration  
Remuneration is the first aspect to be considered with respect to the relation between 
financing agencies and service providers. The question to deal with in this section is 
who regulates the payment of providers. Regulation can affect the remuneration method 
applied and/or the payment rates.  
From the implementation of the public programs, the federal government paid hospi-
tals on a retrospective cost-reimbursement basis. The rates were set at “reasonable cost” 
thereby covering all expenses and allowing the hospitals to break even. This negative 
incentive for cost containment has led to a considerable price increase for hospital stays. 
Due to the recession in the early 1970s, this became an increasing concern for policy 
makers. As a consequence, all hospital prices were frozen for the duration of three years 
in the Economic Stabilization Program (ESP). The late 1970s even witnessed an econ-
omy-wide “voluntary effort” of hospitals to reduce the rate of cost increases (Getzen 
2004, Levit/Lazenby/Braden et al. 1997). But neither the ESP, nor the voluntary efforts 
were regarded as sustainable (Brown 1992). The most path-breaking reform in hospital 
remuneration was the introduction of the DRG-based prospective payment system 
(PPS). Unlike the rate setting programs that were supplanted, DRGs are administered 
prices that reimburse service providers prospectively. In 1983 DRGs were mandatorily 
introduced in the Medicare program. In Medicaid, the federal law regulated to pay hos-
                                                                                                                                               
for policies sold to small employers or to individuals. Individual health insurance plans are also regulated. This 
however, to a lesser extent (Jost 2001).  
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pitals at the same reasonable-cost rates until the states were allowed to pay much lower 
“reasonable and adequate” cost in 1981 (Boren Amendment). These rates were very 
low, thus in a move to prevent risk-selection, the federal government required states to 
make payment adjustments to hospitals, which serve a disproportionate share of Medi-
caid and low-income patients (DSH program) and provided matching funds for these 
purposes (Kaiser Commission 2002: 106). With the BBA of 1997, the government re-
pealed all federal payment regulation in the Medicaid program. Since that point in time 
the states decide on reimbursement policies and are only obliged to publish final rates, 
methodologies, and justifications. Thereby the states are given much more discretion 
with the consequence of large regional disparities in provider remuneration (Weis-
sert/Weissert 2002: 222). A highly relevant aspect is that the states increasingly forced 
their Medicaid beneficiaries to receive their care through managed care arrangements. 
In managed care, provider remuneration is subjected to the management-techniques of 
the private health plans therefore the power to regulate service providers was transferred 
from the government to private actors (Reinhardt 2005). 
Physicians in outpatient practices too, were traditionally free to charge the service 
fees that they deemed appropriate and were reimbursed their full costs, especially while 
out-of-pocket payments was the dominant form of financing outpatient health care ser-
vices. Soon after its’ implementation, Medicare Part B adopted a method called “usual, 
customary, and reasonable” from private non-profit Blue Shield plans in order to limit 
fee-for-service reimbursements (Getzen 2004). Under both, Medicare and Medicaid, 
physicians must accept the assigned payments, which means that they are not allowed to 
balance bills58, or only to a limited extent (Kaiser Commission 2002). From 1992 on, the 
resource-based relative value scale (RBRVS)59 was introduced under the Medicare pro-
gram. RBRVS represents a fee schedule and is coupled with a strict budget for the total 
annual outlay on physician services, the volume performance standard. Like the DRGs, 
private insurers also adopted the RBRVS on a voluntary basis. 
In private insurance managed, care was most relevant for the regulation of service 
providers’ remuneration (see section 2.2 for details). With managed care, a switch from 
a retrospective towards a prospective payment system was implied. Especially in the 
first decades of managed care, when vertically integrated HMOs dominated the man-
                                                 
58  In general, physicians under UCR may still continue to charge the amount they consider as adequate. However, 
they are reimbursed by the insurer according to the scheduled prices and charge the remainder and, where appli-
cable, co-payments to the patient (balance billing). Under the Medicare program, balance billing is allowed,  but 
only up to 15% of the scheduled fees (Reinhardt 2005) 
59  The RBRVS gives each physician service a point value. After the physician and insurance company agree on the 
value per point, payment for each service is determined. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 58) 
- 35 - 
aged care market, considerable control was exerted on service providers (Jacobson 
2001). Completely new incentive schemes were set up with prepaid capitation payments 
and risk was shifted from the health plans to the providers to a considerable degree. As 
a consequence, the growth of managed care had a considerable impact on the incomes 
of physicians (Kronenfeld 2002). With the managed care backlash and the growth of the 
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), less strict remuneration methods are applied 
in managed care, reversing this trend to a certain degree. Thereby vertical integration of 
insurers and service providers gave way to a bargaining process in which insurers and 
providers have to agree on capitation payments or on discounts on fee-for-service rates.  
The results derived from the analysis indicate that the remuneration system was in-
creasingly regulated during the past four decades. In the public programs, this was ex-
erted through government regulation, culminating in the introduction of DRGs and 
RBRVS. But although the government regulated the payment of providers in the public 
programs, it gave the medical profession a relatively free hand in transactions with pri-
vate insurance (Stone 2000: 957). In private insurance, managed care organizations 
have created their own instruments to gain control over service providers, thereby bring-
ing considerable hierarchy into the system. Therefore private market actors worked as a 
substitute for, or as a “functional equivalent” of government regulation. As a growing 
number of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries have meanwhile joined managed care 
plans, the exertion of hierarchical control on provider remuneration has spilled over to 
the public programs. Today the market share of more loosely structured forms of man-
aged care is growing indicating a tendency to relax control over service providers again. 
5.4 Access of health care providers to markets  
The following section describes the regulation of the access of health care providers to 
public or private financing sources. By access regulation, the quantity, the quality 
and/or the price of services in the health care market can be controlled. The pertinent 
question here is therefore to what degree the state assumes this task, and which actors 
take over if it does not.  
As a consequence of the Hill Burton Act, which provided federal funds for hospital 
expansion from 1946 on, there was a sizable surplus of inpatient beds in the 1960/70s 
(Döhler 1990). The regulation of construction set in under the federal National Health 
Planning Act of 1974. This law required all states to adopt certificate-of-need (CON) 
laws by 1980, subjecting expansion as well as new entrants to the hospital market to a 
certification process. The Health System Agency (HSA)-network, a system of state and 
local health planning agencies, was created to oversee the program. Until in the 1980s 
the CON laws were quite successful, but the Supreme Court had to come to the conclu-
sion that they constituted an illegal restraint of trade and repealed the process (Getzen 
2004, Marmor/Mashaw/Harvey 1992). From 1983 on, when DRGs were introduced in 
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the Medicare program, the Congress retreated from the regulation of hospital construc-
tion, convinced that the new payment system would be efficient in regulating the num-
ber of hospital beds (Brown 1992).  
As an additional instrument to gain control over access to the public programs as a 
source of financing, federal and state governments mandated review processes to moni-
tor the quality performance of hospitals from the 1970s onwards (Walshe 2003, Tuohy 
1999). In 1972 the federal government established the Professional Standards Review 
Organizations (PSROs) as a peer review mechanism. The PSROs were able to deny 
approval of payment if the treatment provided was not medically necessary, not of ade-
quate quality, or delivered in an inappropriate facility. Nevertheless, PSROs remained 
ineffective and therefore in 1983 were substituted by the Peer Review Organizations 
(PROs), which have the status of private organizations and may be organized as for-
profit enterprises. The federal grants formerly directed to the PSROs, were supplanted 
by competitive contracts (Brown 1992, Döhler 1990). In 1987 the scope of the PROs 
was extended to the review of outpatient care (Patel/Rushefsky 1999). In addition, the 
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), a private 
non-profit organization composed of members of medical associations60, provides vol-
untary accreditation to hospitals. The JCAHO however, is under the control of profes-
sional bodies and thus in effect a self-regulatory structure (Walshe 2003: 58, Jacobson 
2001).  
An additional aspect in access regulation of inpatient care providers is the tax-
exempt status devoted to non-profit providers. Throughout the observation period, the 
government plays a crucial role in the support of non-profit hospitals through tax subsi-
dies.61 In exchange, these have to provide community benefits, i.e. free or low cost 
health care services to the poor or indigent in exchange thereby mitigating the adverse 
effects the health care system has on the uninsured to a certain degree. Through these 
tax exemptions, the federal government exerts considerable influence on the pub-
lic/private mix in the hospital sector (Gray 1991).  
 Now turning to the outpatient sector, the quantity of physicians also increased dur-
ing the boom of the early 1960s owing to federal support given through the Health Pro-
                                                 
60  The American College of Physicians (ACP), the AHA, the AMA, and the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) 
joined the founders of the JCAHO, the American College of Surgeons (ACS).  
61  Hospitals may be exempt from taxation under section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code. In 1996 the 
amount of aggregate annual tax subsidies is estimated at US$ 8.5 billion. Since the relative importance of non-
profit institutions in providing charity care is declining, however, the current debate is about whether the non-
profits still deserve their tax-free status today. For a very recent discussion of this subject see e.g. the contribu-
tions in Health Affairs, web exclusive No. 25 (2006) at www.healthaffairs.org. 
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fessional Educational Assistance Act (Getzen 2004). Although there was increasing 
concern about the considerable surplus of physicians from 1970 on, federal outlays for 
the training of medical school students remained substantial, leading to a 104% increase 
in the supply of active physicians from 1970 to 1995 (Patel/ Rushefsky 1999, 
Kronenfeld 2002). Today the number of medical schools is regulated by several profes-
sional bodies such as the AMA and the American Association of Medical Colleges 
(AAMC), which have an interest in regulating the number of graduates, and thus check-
ing and constraining the supply of physicians.  
As a private sector approach to the regulation of health plans, the National Commit-
tee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), a private, non-profit organization was established in 
1991. The NCQA makes information on private health plans and physicians available to 
employers and to the general public and is also responsible for the management of 
HEDIS62 (Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set). The NCQA certification 
became increasingly important also for government programs, as most public payers 
require an NCQA-accreditation of the health plans if they are to serve the beneficiaries 
of Medicare or Medicaid.  
Again, it is managed care that had a major impact on physicians’ access to the health 
care market through its policies of selective contracting and credentialing. Both affected 
physicians’ bargaining power, allowing competition and control to enter a formerly 
autonomous professional field. However, beginning in the mid-1990s, service providers 
also sought to restore their autonomy and to regain market power. Supported by the 
backlash from the general public and the media against managed care, they were able to 
exert pressure on states’ legislators, which weakened the ability of managed care or-
ganizations to exert control over service providers’ access to financial resources 
(Rich/Erb 2005, Blendon/Brodie/Benson et al. 1998). 
Subsuming these observations briefly, the government increasingly restricted access 
for providers to the public sources of financing from 1965 onwards. The quality control 
requirements gave rise to new forms of cooperation between public and private entities 
(Jacobson 2001, Döhler 1990). But these structures are largely self-regulatory mecha-
nisms, dominated by the medical profession. In the realm of private insurance, the role 
of the state in regulating access was weak at the beginning of our observation period 
and still remains defensive today. From the private market side managed care came into 
play, initiating fierce competition amongst service providers about access to financial 
resources. Paradoxically, while the federal and the states’ government were promoting 
                                                 
62  HEDIS is a set of standardized performance measures for comparing the performance of managed health care 
plans. HEDIS also includes a standardized survey of consumers’ experiences that evaluates plan performance. 
HEDIS is sponsored, supported and maintained by the NCQA (see http://www.ncqa.org/ Programs/HEDIS). 
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managed care for the beneficiaries of the public programs, the states forced managed 
care organizations to relax their regulatory instruments at the same time (Rich/Erb 
2005). Thus, over the past decade, the medical profession has been able to regain some 
elements of autonomy and the scope for self-regulation.  
5.5 Access of patients to health care providers 
When exploring the access of patients to health care providers, the underlying value of 
freedom of choice comes into play, as it may be explicitly or implicitly restricted when 
it comes to regulation. In order to assess the role of the state, we examine which actor(s) 
regulate the patients’ access to service providers. 
In the public programs, access of patients to health care providers was restricted to 
physicians, hospitals, and other service providers who take assignment, i.e. they have to 
acknowledge an approved rate as payment in full before treating Medicaid and Medi-
care patients. Medicare payments are an important source of revenue, so service provid-
ers regularly agreed to take assignment. This incentive does not necessarily work with 
Medicaid patients, however. Although benefits must be provided by law, and medical 
professional ethic also demands this, physician treatment is often actually denied to 
Medicaid patients (Getzen 2004). This means effectively that risk-selection takes place, 
discriminating against those with low ability to pay. In addition, the federal government 
gave the states wide discretion to limit Medicaid recipients’ freedom to choose doctors 
or hospitals through the Boren Amendment in 1981 (Patel/Rushefsky 1999). In order to 
guarantee a minimum access to health care for the most severe risk groups, the federal 
government enacted the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA)63 in 1985, which required that hospital access be granted to emergency pa-
tients even when they are not able to pay.  
In private insurance, the unrestricted freedom of choice of medical care providers has 
prevailed in times of indemnity insurance, a principle that for a long time was upheld by 
organized physicians. This changed fundamentally when HMOs gained a foothold, re-
stricting the access of patients to health care providers to pre-selected groups or net-
works and through gatekeeping. In addition, new professional carriers like the nurse 
practitioner or the physician assistant were created, to supplant the treatment by physi-
cians in the case of less severe ailments (Scott/Ruef/Mendel et al. 2000). Furthermore, 
the access of patients to specialist services was restricted through utilization reviews, a 
widely used instrument in managed care arrangements. As the participation of Medicare 
                                                 
63  The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), which was passed in 1985 as part of the 
COBRA, requires hospitals to provide an appropriate medical screening exam and to treat patients until they are 
stable, or are transferred to another facility. 
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and Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care increased over time, the restrictions put on 
patients’ access to providers spilled over to the public programs. 
When the market share of HMOs started to fall from the mid-1990s on and PPOs 
gradually became the most dominant type of managed care arrangement, the gatekeep-
ing requirement was dropped and also the option to choose the provider was restored 
(Newbrander/Eichler 2001). Most states supported this development with legislation 
enabling direct access to specialists, thereby weakening the gatekeepers’ function (As-
pen Health Law Center 1998). PPOs restrict patients’ access to a pre-selected network 
of providers, which are selected according to their performance characteristics, but they 
allow a free choice of provider at the cost of higher cost-sharing.  
When summarizing these changes, it is necessary to start from the fact that tradition-
ally a free choice of provider was promoted as a “patient’s right” which was heavily 
protected by the medical profession. Again, private managed care has brought about the 
most crucial changes in the regulation of the system. The introduction of privately or-
ganized managed care into the US health care system brought in the strong and effective 
elements of gatekeeping and selectively contracted provider networks. The emergence 
of more loosely structured managed care arrangements weakened the restrictions with 
the effect that the patients regained choice and service providers were able to restore 
their autonomy. The government has restricted the access of patients to health care pro-
viders under the public programs by setting a limit on provider payments. The benefici-
aries who (were forced to) join managed care, though experienced considerably stronger 
elements of control of access to providers. 
5.6 Benefit package  
The benefit package comprises the number and kind of services that are (regularly) cov-
ered by an insurance contract. As an indicative of the role of the state in regulation, the 
content of the benefit package can be defined by law. If insurers and/or other actors de-
termine the scope of benefits, however, it may become an instrument of competition. 
Right from its inception, it was the function of the Health Care Financing Admini-
stration (HCFA) to supervise whether new procedures and technologies are to be rated 
as “reasonable and necessary” for Medicare services. In 1978 the National Center for 
Health Care Technology (NCHCT) was established as a government measure to manage 
developments in medical technology. NCHCT was required to disseminate, publish, and 
make available all standards, norms, and criteria developed concerning the use of par-
ticular health care technologies, but it had no regulatory competencies. After federal 
funding for NCHCT ceased in 1982, the private non-profit Institutes of Medicine (IOM) 
took over. Until today, the IOM provide evidence-based information and advice to pol-
icy-makers and the public. Evidence-based medicine and Health Technology Assess-
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 58) 
- 40 - 
ment (HTA)64 were also established through the public Agency for Health Care Re-
search and Quality (AHRQ), which was founded in 1996 and offers services to public 
and private bodies. In its inception, the AHRQ was commissioned with the development 
of clinical guidelines but meanwhile has retreated from this task and focuses on quality 
measurement and general improvements in health care. The AHRQ makes clinical prac-
tice guidelines available to the public; but the development of these guidelines is in the 
hand of professional bodies.  
Nowadays, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) evaluate services 
on the basis of HTA reports. In general, the CMS determines a uniform benefit package 
for all Medicare beneficiaries by law. Even if Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in 
managed care, a minimum benefit package must be provided. In the case of the recently 
introduced drug benefit, for example, the Medicare statutes regulate that private insurers 
must offer either a defined standard benefit or an alternative that is equal in value (“ac-
tuarially equivalent”) (Kaiser Foundation 2006). Apart from that minimum requirement, 
the government delegates the management of benefits to private insurers. As a conse-
quence, beneficiaries in managed care are more restricted in the benefits they receive 
than under the traditional Medicare program (Reinhardt 2005). Reinhardt (2005: 100) 
therefore detects a shift from defined benefits to defined contributions65, which consti-
tutes a major change in the fundamentals of social insurance.  
Under the Medicaid program, the federal government determines a minimum benefit 
package by requiring that in order to receive federal matching funds certain basic ser-
vices must be offered to the categorically needy population in any state program. Any 
amendments made to the benefits package must be submitted to the state Medicaid plan 
for approval by the CMS. Under a special category of waivers, in this case the section 
1115 waiver, the single US-member states may vary the benefit package. The most re-
nowned experiment with the 1115 waiver is the Oregon Health Plan, which in the 1990s 
allowed the state of Oregon to include a larger part of the population into the Medicare 
program at the cost of the denial of services to all Medicaid recipients (cf. Roth-
gang/Greß/Niebuhr et al. 2004). 
In the private scheme, the insurer has a relatively free reign in the determination of 
the content of the benefit package. Thus, beneath the premium rate, the benefit package 
                                                 
64  Health Technology Assessment (HTA) is a technical means to support decision-making regarding the content of 
the benefit package. Evidence-based medicine and clinical practice guidelines, in contrast, focus on the manage-
ment of specific clinical problems or disease conditions. 
65  A defined benefit plan promises a specific health benefit. Defined contribution plans in contrast, do not specify 
which benefits will be obtained but the amount to be contributed, instead. Therefore the benefits of defined con-
tribution plans are less calculable.  
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constitutes an important element of competition. Packages vary considerably, ranging 
not only from indemnity insurance to managed care arrangements, but also from one 
contract to another. In general, managed care competed by offering more comprehen-
sive benefit packages including preventive services.  
Most states regulate the content of the benefit package to a certain degree, for exam-
ple by mandating coverage for special treatments (e.g. prevention) or by requiring pri-
vate insurers to include some types of services, as e.g. optometrists and chiropractors 
services (GAO 1996). But regulation varies considerably from state to state. In addition, 
as emphasized before, ERISA exempts all self-funded employer-sponsored health plans 
from states’ regulation of the benefit package. It should also be borne in mind that in 
employer-sponsored insurance decisions concerning the benefit package are influenced 
by employers’ pre-selection of health plans. In Medical Saving Accounts (MSA), a de-
fined benefit catalogue only applies as far as it is defined by the high-deductible health 
plan MSA have to be combined with, which again implicates a shift from defined bene-
fits to defined contributions. MSA are not yet wide spread, but they are heavily pro-
moted by the current Bush Administration (Fuchs/James 2005).  
Over all public and private schemes, the benefit package in some cases is highly in-
complete and therefore much of the health risk has to be borne by the insured person. 
This phenomenon still lacks an analytical definition, but is described on an empirical 
basis by the term “under”insurance. Schoen/Davis/How et al. (2006) estimate, that 
about 35 % of all US adults were either uninsured or underinsured in 2003. 
In sum, while under the public programs the benefit package is determined by gov-
ernment regulation; it constitutes an element of competition in private insurance. With 
the government regulation of benefit packages in private insurance being weak, their 
content is in the first instance left to the insurers and is influenced by employers’ pre-
selection of health plans. Most importantly, the decision on the scope of the benefit 
package partially devolves from government to private insurers when government shifts 
its Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries into managed care arrangements.  
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Starting from the two major trajectories elaborated in this contribution, the results sub-
sumed in this concluding section will be broken down into the main categories of analy-
ses i.e. the financing, the service provision and the regulation dimension. The first as-
pect elaborated in this paper is that the role of the state has increased considerably in the 
American health care system, especially in financing and thereby also in the regulation 
of the government financed programs. But in the realm of private insurance, hierarchical 
state regulation especially vis-à-vis private service providers remained weak. Therefore 
the second point to be made is that as a consequence of this regulatory “vacuum”, pri-
vate insurance arrangements commonly subsumed under the term managed care, par-
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tially filled in this gap by developing their own modes of governing providers’ and pa-
tients’ behaviour. Interestingly, although supportive in many respects, it is not the state 
but private market actors that brought these mechanisms of hierarchical coordination 
into the health care system. 
Coming now to the results in detail, we see a strong increase of public involvement 
in the financing dimension. Through Medicare and Medicaid, the public sector took 
over responsibility in financing health care for the most expensive health risks. Social 
insurance financing, a source with almost no relevance until 1965, became an important 
element of the financing mix from the introduction of Medicare on. Most funding, how-
ever, comes from taxes today. Especially in the first decades of our observation period, 
collective financing through private insurance also increased stimulated by govern-
ments’ tax policy. As a consequence, out-of-pocket payments declined considerably in 
relation to other sources of funding. At about the same time, though, the re-
distributional aspects of private insurance financing decreased. Hereby the major part of 
the population is affected, as private insurance is the dominant mode of coverage in the 
American health care system.  
In the service provision dimension, direct state involvement in the delivery of ser-
vices was traditionally low and diminished over time. More precisely, we do not only 
observe that the role of the state decreases directly as a consequence of diminishing 
beds capacities in public ownership, but we also witness an implicit retreat of the state 
as less resources were devoted to the inpatient care sector. The corollary is that service 
delivery in the US is predominately private. At the same time, the government influ-
ences the provider structure by providing tax subsidies to the benefit of private non-
profit inpatient care providers. As a consequence, non-profit providers by far dominate 
the hospital market until today. Hence, the hypothesis of a change from the “positive to 
the regulatory state” (Majone 1997) is supported in hospital care, which means that the 
retreat of the state is partially compensated by a corrective through government regula-
tion. 
Beginning in the early1970s, the state also interfered more heavily in the professional 
autonomy, as we observed in the regulation dimension. But these hierarchical provider 
regulations remained restricted to the public programs. In transactions with private in-
surance, in contrast, the state gave the medical profession a relatively free hand. Hierar-
chically structured, private managed care arrangements filled this regulatory vacuum 
and acted as a substitute, or as a “functional equivalent”, to government regulation. Es-
pecially Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) allowed for control over providers 
and patients as they introduced strong instruments like gatekeeping and selective con-
tracting. Thus private actors brought in a considerable degree of hierarchical regulation 
into the American health care system. But service providers were also able to restore 
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their autonomy. With the backlash against HMOs, which was supported by states legis-
lation, more loosely structured managed care arrangements gained ground. Thus the 
managed care market tends to be less regulative today than in the mid-1990s. At the 
same time, bargaining emerged as a coordination mechanism in the relationship be-
tween insurers and providers as new remuneration methods were established. 
Also on the financing side, government regulation mainly affected Medicare and 
Medicaid while the state has not exerted much hierarchical control on the private insur-
ance market. Here managed care also played a role as it reduced premium rates while at 
the same time offering more comprehensive services. Yet today, private insurance pre-
miums grow rapidly and the number of the uninsured increases as government failed to 
mandate universal health insurance.  
While the demarcation line between the public and private programs was quite sharp 
until the mid-1980s, these boundaries became increasingly blurred during the past dec-
ades. New remuneration methods and fee schedules established in Medicare constitute a 
“public good” which was adopted by private insurers. On the other hand, more Medi-
care and especially Medicaid beneficiaries join managed care, thus we observe a spill 
over effect from private hierarchical arrangements to the public programs.  
In sum, an increasing role of the state is observable in financing and in the regulation 
of the US health care system. Thus we find a considerable blurring of the formerly pri-
vate system of health care financing through the incorporation and strengthening of 
public modes of financing, namely tax-funding and social insurance financing. But at 
the same time we observe a loss of solidarity in private insurance funding. In the service 
provision dimension, the state is on the retreat. While state regulation in the first in-
stance increased in the realm of the public programs, private managed care arrange-
ments partially filled in this regulatory gap by developing their own instruments of hier-
archical coordination. Today, as the boundaries between public and private programs 
blur, the hierarchical governance mechanisms of private managed care arrangements 
increasingly complement (and even substitute) government regulation. As a result, 
within the past forty years, the regulation of the American health care system changed 
from a private competition-based structure into a most complex public/private mix. One 
of its basic characteristics, i.e. the significance of private market actors, has been pre-
served over time. 
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